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ABSTRACT 
The demand, through government regulations, for the preservation of the 
security, integrity, and privacy of corporate and customer information is 
increasing at an unprecedented pace. Government and private entities struggle 
to comply with these regulations through various means—both automated and 
manual controls. This paper presents an automated security compliance toolkit 
that is designed and developed using mostly open source tools to demonstrate 
that 1) meeting regulatory compliance does not need to be a very expensive 
proposition and 2) an undertaking of this magnitude could be served as a 
pedagogical exercise for students in the areas of collaboration, project 
management, software engineering, information assurance, and regulatory 
compliance. 
Keywords: Information Security, Compliance Toolkit, Forensics, Log 
Management, Intrusion Detection, Vulnerability Assessment, Sarbanes-Oxley, 
HIPAA, FISMA, GLBA. 
1.   INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of federal regulations involving cybersecurity ushered the 
hottest buzzword in information technology: compliance. These federal 
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regulations include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (last amended in 2001), 
Computer Security Act (1987), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (1995); Financial Services Modernization Act (also known as Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), 1999), USA Patriot Act (2001; renewed in 2006), 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002), and the Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA, 2002). The implications of these enactments clearly 
define the urgent need to meet their requirements. Attached to some of these 
regulations are fines and prison terms if regulated entities are found to be in 
non-compliance. Perhaps more importantly, other risks of non-compliance 
include the public disclosure of key assets, loss of customers, delisting from 
stock exchanges, damage to brand or company reputation, negative impact to 
stock price, shareholder lawsuits, and a loss in confidence in key company 
stakeholders.  
Adding to the trouble of compliance is the fact that the requirements of many 
regulations frequently overlap, leaving businesses with the challenge of sorting 
out which solutions satisfy which requirements of which regulations. In 
(Schwartz, 2006), it was reported that Qumas, a vendor of life sciences 
compliance products, discovered that the processes and policies required by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have a lot in common with those 
required by SOX and the Patriot Act.  
As new mandates and legislation are imposed upon businesses, it is becoming 
increasingly important for companies to find ways to manage the mapping and 
identification of requirements into easily deployable policies and strategies. 
However, companies find these to be very expensive undertakings. In 2005, 
corporate spending on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance effort was 
estimated to be $6.1 billion (Cognos, 2006). A survey conducted by the 
Security Compliance Council reveals that an average of 34% of an 
organization’s IT resources are spent on compliance (Perry, 2006). Truly, the 
expense of compliance is extremely high, and businesses that are 
unintentionally deploying redundant and unnecessary solutions are only adding 
to the high cost and frustration of compliance (Kolodgy, 2006). This paper 
presents an automated security compliance toolkit that is designed and 
developed using mostly open source tools to demonstrate that meeting 
regulatory compliance does not need to be very expensive. We developed a 
compliance matrix that helped us identify the overlapping requirements of four 
main regulations on each sector of the industry and designed the toolkit based 
on these common needs.  
2. THE REGULATIONS 
2.1 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
Congress passed HIPAA in 1996. HIPAA is the first federal law to address 
health privacy in a comprehensive way (Cole, 2006; Swartz, 2003). It requires 
companies to adopt administrative, physical, and technical measures to protect 
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the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of certain health information. In 
addition, the Security section of HIPAA and set of HIPAA regulations known 
as the Privacy Rule have, for some time, required companies to implement 
general security measures to protect health information. The Security Rule, 
under HIPAA, requires companies to create, receive, transmit or maintain 
health information in an electronic format to meet much more detailed set of 
security standards than the HIPAA Privacy Rule (Langin, 2004). 
HIPAA applies “covered entities” as defined in the law. This term includes: 
healthcare providers, plans, and clearinghouses. Health plans provide or pay 
for the cost of healthcare. Clearinghouses are entities that process and facilitate 
information relating to an individual’s health, health care, or health care 
payment. Healthcare providers are doctors, dentists, hospitals, clinics, nurses, 
medical groups or other providers of medical services that maintain or transmit 
health information in an electronic form (Langin, 2004).  According to HIPAA 
rules, if an organization provides one of a number of specified services for a 
covered entity and the service involves disclosing protected health information, 
it is a business associate. And business associates are directly affected by the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule. These business associates may include vendors, 
consultants, lawyers, auditors, clearinghouses, billing firms, and records 
storage organizations (Swartz, 2003). 
2.2 The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) 
According to (Nelson, 2006), in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, 
Congress passed the E-Government Act, which formally recognized the 
importance of information security to the United States' economic and national 
security interests. FISMA, title III of the act, requires federal agencies to 
develop, document, and implement agency-wide information security programs 
to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information and 
systems that support the operations and assets of the agency.  
Compliance with FISMA is the law and government agencies are fully 
accountable for their success in meeting this goal. FISMA is codified in 
FIPS199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 
Information Systems, which was signed into law December 2003. FIPS 199 
defined the requirements to use by Federal agencies in categorizing 
information and information systems in order to provide appropriate levels of 
information security. Implemented in March 2006, FIPS200, Minimum 
Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems, takes 
the next step. FIPS200 categorizes systems as required by FIPS199 and then 
selects the appropriate set of security controls from technical guidance 
documents developed by National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) (Nelson, 2006). 
FISMA's provisions fall into three major categories: assessment, enforcement, 
and compliance. The first pertains to determining the adequacy of the security 
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of federal assets, the second requires that key information security provisions 
be implemented and managed, and the third established provisions for the 
management of each agency's information security program and the 
accountability of each agency for compliance and reporting. In addition, 
FISMA requires the reporting of significant deficiencies. Agencies must 
identify and track material weaknesses and report any progress. Using a Plan of 
Action and Milestones (POA&M), each agency must commit to a schedule of 
remediation (Qualys Guard Enterprise, 2006).   
2.3 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
The Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 was enacted by the US Congress 
mainly to address the crisis brought about by the WorldCom and Enron 
debacle to the financial markets. The law is ratified to enforce accountability 
for financial record- keeping and reporting of publicly traded corporations. The 
CEO and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) are directly responsible for the 
completeness and accuracy of their institution’s financial reporting and record-
keeping systems (PCAOB, 2006; Whitman and Mattord, 2004).  
2.4 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial Services 
Modernization Act, was signed into law in November 1999. The law applies to 
companies that offer financial products and services to individuals, including 
banks, insurance companies, mortgage companies, securities brokers, loan 
brokers, some financial or investment advisors, tax preparers, providers of real 
estate settlement services, and debt collectors (Dhillon, 2006; Qualys Guard 
Enterprise, 2006). 
2.5 Common Compliance Challenges 
Regardless of the regulation, there appears to be a common set of challenges 
companies experience when faced with compliance. The challenges, which are 
detailed in (Scalable Software, 2006), are as follows: 
• Understanding regulatory mandates. 
• Identifying specific requirements. 
• Creating a system of control across multiple standards. 
• Documenting the compliance auditing approach. 
• Collecting and preserving compliance audit evidence. 
 
3. THE COMPLIANCE MATRIX 
Our objective in building the toolkit is to be as far reaching as possible. In 
order to accomplish this objective, we decided on identifying a representative 
regulation in each enterprise sector and determining shared control objectives. 
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Thus, we arrived at the following mapping and compliance criterion matrix: 
• Public company sector ? SOX 
• Banking and finance sector ? GLBA 
• Health care sector ? HIPAA 
• Federal government sector ? FISMA 
We found more than the twelve common control objectives that are depicted in 
Table 1. However, due to time and personnel constraints, we decided to 
concentrate our development efforts to satisfying the top twelve common 
control objectives. 
 
CONTROL OBJECTIVES 
Document Preservation 
Document 
Disposition/Destruction 
Device/Media Control 
Media Reuse 
Encryption/Decryption 
Authentication(2-level) 
Transmission Security 
Log Management/ Monitoring 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Intrusion Detection 
Report & Benchmark 
Message Security 
 
Table 1. The Compliance Criterion Control Objectives 
 
3.1. The Twelve Common Compliance Control Objectives 
Group I:  Document Control 
1) Document Preservation – A system must be in place to gather the 
document hash digest and create a backup of the document in a 
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secondary storage device. The hash digest is necessary for future 
verification and non-repudiation. 
2) Device and Media Control – This control requires an accounting and 
access control system to be in place for all devices and storage media.  
A secure system must be provided for all media transport. 
3) Document Encryption and Decryption – An encryption/decryption 
system should be utilized for all electronic documents. 
Group II: Privacy and Intellectual Property Control 
4) Media Reuse – Due to the fact that the media is going to be reused in-
house, the requirement of this control is not as stringent as that in the 
disposition control. This control requires complete document deletion 
and reformatting of the media involved.   
5) Document Disposal and Destruction – This control assumes that the 
media will be disposed and moved out of the company premises. Thus, 
a system that will, at the very least, completely obliterate the media or 
the documents stored in them is required. A simple deletion and 
formatting system would not be sufficient to meet this control 
objective.  
6) Access Authentication – The minimum requirement of this control 
objective is the utilization of a two-factor authentication for document 
access. 
Group III: Vulnerability Assessment and Proactive Control 
7) Transmission Security – This control objective requires that all 
electronic document transmissions be made through secure channels 
such SSL or VPN. Covert transmission mechanisms such as 
steganography are not acceptable.    
8) Log Management and Monitoring – A system that continuously 
monitors, manages, and rotates log files for the purposes of proactive 
security checking and record keeping is required by this control. The 
rotated log files must be properly labeled and stored for possible future 
audits or forensic investigations.   
9) Vulnerability Assessment – This control objective requires that a 
system and physical vulnerability assessment (VA) should be 
conducted on a regular basis. Every time a weakness is identified by 
the VA process, immediate corrective measures must be identified, 
documented, and implemented by the security team.   
10) Intrusion Detection – An intrusion detection system (IDS) is required 
to be in-place in strategic system locations. A constant monitoring of 
critical system resources such as the firewall must be in place to 
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deflect, not only external threats but also, security breaches that may 
originate from within the perimeter. The IDS provides a mechanism 
for early detection of security violation and for an appropriate reaction 
or countermeasure corresponding to such violation.  
11) Report and Benchmark – A benchmarking and reporting mechanism is 
required to a) demonstrate the degree of compliance that was achieved 
to auditors, b) assist the system administrators in securing new 
installations and production systems, and c) inform upper management 
personnel about the status of the company’s compliance projects.  
12) Message Preservation and Security – The preservation of electronic 
documents that facilitate communications is a major emphasis found in 
almost all regulations. The message transmitting tools may include, 
among others, emails, weblogs, and instant messages (IMs). It is 
imperative that companies provide tools that collect and preserve them 
for possible future forensic investigation and analysis. 
 
4. COMPLIANCE FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS 
4.1 IT Governance Frameworks 
Despite the complex nature of federal standards and regulations, there are 
similarities in their basic frameworks. The process of deploying and regularly 
testing the efficacy of those controls becomes much more efficient if 
businesses can identify a universal set of those controls that satisfy major 
frameworks (Kolodgy, 2006). These best practices IT frameworks are excellent 
guidance tools for compliance and policy development. Examples of these 
frameworks include COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and Related 
Technology), ITIL (IT Infrastructure Library), and ISO (International 
Standards Organization) 17799 (Feldman, 2006). 
The COBIT framework comprises of four domain measures of IT products: 
Planning and Organization, Acquisition and Implementation, Delivery and 
Support, and Monitoring (ISACA, 2006). 
ITIL is a cohesive set of best practices that were drawn from public and private 
entities worldwide. It consists of a series of books giving guidance on the 
provision of quality of IT services and on the environmental facilities needed 
to support IT (ITIL, 2006). 
ISO 17799 provides organizations an international standard for information 
security. The standard is divided into 10 working sections which include, 
among others, Security Policy, Access Control and Compliance, Asset 
Classification and Management, Configuration and Vulnerability Management, 
Business Continuity Management, and Operational Change Control (ISO, 
2006). 
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4.2 Commercial Tools 
There is a plethora of commercial compliance tools that are available on the 
market. Although some of these tools are built around open source software 
that are available over the Internet, they tend to be very complex and 
expensive. In order to familiarize the reader about the features of the 
commercial tools, we briefly describe a few of them in what follows.  
Symantec Control Compliance Suite (Symantec 2006). This suite of tools 
provides regulatory content for SOX, FISMA, HIPAA, GLBA, and Base II. It 
has 600 out-of-the-box reports which automatically identify potential security 
threats. Additional features include validation of windows configurations, 
security audits of networks, monitoring of Windows event logs, and locating 
users with weak passwords and expired accounts.  
Tripwire Enterprise (Tripwire 2006). This tool monitors changes to critical 
applications such as databases, network configurations, directory services, and 
file systems. It also provides a facility for audit trails, assessing system damage 
after an attack, detecting undesirable system changes, and tracking of 
monitoring devices.    
NetIO Risk and Compliance Center (NetIQ 2006). NetIQ provides several 
solutions for each of the following regulations: SOX, HIPAA, GLBA, and 
FISMA. In addition, companies that need to get a better control of their 
security practices may opt for solutions that cover the following standards: 
ITIL, ISO17799, COBIT, and NIST 800-53. 
Qualys Guard Enterprise(QualysGuard 2006). The Qualys Guard has the 
largest knowledgebase of vulnerability signatures in the industry. It includes 
tools for network mapping, vulnerability scanning, risk analysis, report 
generation, end-to-end encryption, and security architecture audits. 
4.3. Open Source Tools 
The following open source security-related tools are mostly available for 
download from the Internet and can be utilized to meet control objectives that 
pertain, but not limited, to vulnerability assessment, encryption, intrusion 
detection, non-repudiation, log management, authentication, and secure file 
management and obliteration. 
TrueCrypt (TrueCrypt 2006). This is a software system that performs on-the-
fly encryption of a storage device volume. The encryption process is done 
automatically, i.e. without user intervention, before loading or saving the data. 
The entire file system mounted on that encrypted volume is, by itself, also 
completely encrypted. Thus, the file property, metadata, link, and free space 
information are securely encoded. The availability of a wide selection of 
encryption algorithms makes this tool an excellent choice for meeting the 
control objectives that require encryption. Figure 1 depicts the Graphical User 
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Interface (GUI) of TrueCrypt. 
 
 
Figure 1. TrueCrypt Graphical User Interface 
 
MS Log Parser Toolkit (Giuseppini and Burnett, 2004). The Log Parser tool 
first appeared as a utility for testing the logging mechanism of Microsoft’s 
Internet Information Services (IIS). It provided users the ability to retrieve and 
display all the fields from a single log file in any of the three text-logging 
formulas supported by IIS. As the tests became more complex, more 
specifically the filtering of log entries, Microsoft saw an immediate need for a 
log management tool. Version 2.0 was the first version that was made available 
outside of Microsoft. MS Log Parser Version 2.2 shipped in January 2005 and 
is designed and engineered with the vision of helping users achieve their data-
processing goals in a simple, fast, and powerful way (Giuseppini and Burnett, 
2004). Technically, the tool is not an open source but a free tool that Microsoft 
shares with the IT community. A snippet of a Log Parser command is shown in 
figure 2. 
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Figure 2. An MS Log Parser Session 
Metasploit Framework. This framework provides a complete workbench for 
writing, testing, and using exploit code. It is, in fact, a solid platform for 
penetration testing, shellcode development, and vulnerability assessment. The 
framework is available for multiple operating systems such as Linux, 
Windows, BSD, and MacOS X. A screenshot of the metsploit framework at 
work is shown in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. A Metasploit Framework Screenshot 
OSSEC Host-based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS). This is an open source 
Host-based Intrusion Detection System which provides basic security and 
intrusion detection services such as log analysis, integrity checking, rootkit 
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detection, and time-based alerting. A basic configuration of this system calls 
for an installation of a server, where reports are being forwarded to and 
analyzed. The reports originate from multiple clients or agents, which are the 
stations that need monitoring (OSSEC, 2006). 
Center for Internet Security (CIS) Next Generation (NG) Scoring Tool This 
scoring tool enables users verify the security configuration of systems and 
network devices for conformance with established benchmarks. In addition it 
can be used to demonstrate to auditors the system’s compliance with the 
internationally accepted standards for security configuration. The CIS Scoring 
Tools are host based and produce reports that guide users and system 
administrators to secure both new installations and production systems (Center 
for Internet Security, 2006). Figure 4 depicts a snapshot of the questionnaire 
that is presented to the user for input. Essentially, the questionnaire acts like an 
interviewer that extracts pertinent system information from the user. 
 
Figure 4. The NG Tool Questionnaire 
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Figure 5 displays the section of the benchmark report which shows the status of 
each security item. An item labeled with the status “Failed” is non-compliant 
with the benchmark recommendation; a “Passed” status indicates meeting or 
exceeding the benchmark; a “Not Tested” status indicates that the item is either 
having a benchmark value which not defined or is too subjective to have a 
recommended value.  Figure 6 is a portion of the Benchmark Summary Report. 
It shows the actual score garnered and the maximum score possible for each 
item. 
 
Figure 5. Status of Security Items 
 
Active@KillDisk. This freeware demo tool (a professional version is available 
at minimal cost) is used to completely delete information bits from a disk. The 
standard system commands found in most operating systems such as delete, 
format, and fdisk are simply inadequate in completely erasing the files on a 
disk. Furthermore, Active@KillDisk conforms to four international standards 
for clearing and sanitizing data. These standards are: US DOD 5220.22-M, 
German VISTR, Russian GOST p50739.95, and Gutmann method. The only 
drawback is that the software needs to be loaded on a bootable floppy disk to 
be operable. 
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Figure 6. Summary of the Benchmark Report 
System iNtrusion Analysis & Reporting Environment (SNARE). This is an open 
source tool that allows the collection and forwarding of Windows event logs to a 
remote audit event collection facility, the SNARE microserver (InterSectAlliance, 
2006). An enterprise version of the microserver is available as a commercial 
product which is fully supported by the IntersectAlliance Company. SNARE, 
which is an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Windows, allows system and 
security administrators full access and remote control of the application through a 
web browser. The application uses intelligent agents to automate the collection and 
reporting of log data. The SNARE agent tool is also available for Solaris, AIX, 
IRIX, Unix, and Fedora Linux operating systems.  A SNARE Event Window 
graphical user interface is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. A SNARE Event Window 
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5. THE AUTOMATED COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT 
The philosophy behind the design and implementation of the automated 
compliance toolkit is simplicity and affordability. The three-tier design of the 
system provides flexibility to adapt new technologies and future expandability.  
Figure 8 depicts the system architecture of the toolkit. 
The following section is a brief description of each subsystem. 
Subsystem 1: The Device and Media Control Subsystem. The function of this 
subsystem is to provide the necessary services to be able to properly secure and 
document the transfer of storage media. Additional services that are afforded by 
this subsystem are media reuse, document and media disposal and destruction, and 
document preservation and non-repudiation. . The open source tools that are used 
in creating this subsystem are TrueCrypt for media encryption and non-
repudiation, Eraser for media reuse and destruction, mySQL database for media 
cataloging and tracking.  
Subsystem 2: The Encryption Subsystem. This subsystem is used for the 
encryption and decryption of files. The open source, TrueCrypt, is adopted for the 
intended purpose of this subsystem.   
Subsystem 3: The Authentication Subsystem. This subsystem is designed and 
implemented using two-factor authentication. The first factor requires a strong 
password while the second factor is a 512-bit soft-token that is randomly generated 
and stored in portable USB memory stick. The authentication subsystem is used 
to validate the users of the compliance toolkit.  
Subsystem 4: The Vulnerability Assessment Subsystem. The Metasploit 
Framework and the Log Parser tool are complementary instruments that are 
used to build this subsystem.  
Subsystem 5: The Intrusion Detection Subsystem. This Intrusion Detection 
subsystem utilizes the open source IDS tools, SNARE and OSSEC. In the both 
of the SNARE and OSSEC configuration schemes, a server is deployed using a 
Windows host and a number of system data collection agent tools are installed 
in client hosts running Fedora Linux, Solaris, and Windows.  
Subsystem 6: The Message Preservation Subsystem. The primary objective of 
this subsystem is to facilitate the preservation of electronic documents that are 
used in business and personal transactions. The open source tools that are used 
in creating this subsystem are TrueCrypt for message encryption, decryption, 
and non-repudiation, mySQL for record cataloging and tracking, and WinZip 
for file compression.  
 
 
Subsystem 7: The Log Management Subsystem. The MS Log Parser is our 
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primary tool in this subsystem. We built an automated data management 
process of log rotation, preservation, and retrieval using the .Net Framework 
and the Log Parser. In addition, the logs are maintained for traceability and 
accountability in order to comply with the auditing requirements of multiple 
regulations. 
Subsystem 8: The Report and Benchmark Subsystem. This subsystem is built 
primarily with the Center for Internet Security (CIS) Next Generation (NG) 
Scoring Tool. The purpose of this subsystem is to verify the security 
configuration of systems and network devices for conformance with 
established benchmarks. Reports that are generated by this tool will be used as 
instruments to document partial or full compliance with federal and state 
regulations.  
 
Figure 8. The Compliance Toolkit’s System Architecture 
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A mapping of the control objectives, which were identified earlier, with the 
toolkit subsystems is shown in Table 2. The mapping illustrates which 
subsystems satisfy each control objective. 
 
Table 2. Mapping of Objectives with Subsystems 
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PLANS 
We have presented a compliance toolkit that was designed and built using open 
source software. As the toolkit evolved, we discovered more features are 
immediately realizable using minor tweaks of the system parameters. In doing so, 
we covered more control objectives that we have not anticipated during the design 
phase. Such features include, among others, security policy auditing, log data 
warehousing and mining, visual data analytics, and configuration change control. 
Although the toolkit was designed and implemented to be a proof-of-concept 
Toolkit Subsystem  
Control Objective 1 2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 7 8 
Document Preservation ?     ? ? ? 
Document Disposal and 
Destruction ?  
    
? ? 
Device/Media Control ?        
Media Reuse ?        
Encryption/Decryption ? ?       
Authentication(2-level)   ?      
Transmission Security ? ?       
Log Management 
And Monitoring ?  
    
?  
Vulnerability Assessment    ?     
Intrusion Detection     ?    
Report & Benchmark        ? 
Message Security       ? ?  
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variety of a viable commercial instrument, it has the capability to partially meet the 
compliance requirements of most regulations. We are confident that we have 
achieved our stated goal at the onset, i.e. to demonstrate that meeting regulatory 
compliance does not need to be a very expensive proposition. Most importantly, 
we have demonstrated that providing students with a meaningful pedagogical 
exercise on the areas of collaboration, project management, software engineering, 
information assurance, and regulatory compliance is feasible and worthwhile. 
The future plans for this toolkit are 
1) to continuously enhance its features to cover more control objectives, 
2) to add an intelligent agent component  that will automate most of the 
data collection processes and alert functions, and 
3) to study the feasibility of configuring the entire toolkit in a stand-
alone embedded appliance system. 
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